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Mohammad Esmaeilpour, Student Member, IEEE, Patrick Cardinal, Member, IEEE, and Alessandro Lameiras
Koerich, Member, IEEE
Abstract—In this paper, we demonstrate the extreme vulnera-
bility of a residual deep neural network architecture (ResNet-18)
against adversarial attacks in time-frequency representations of
audio signals. We evaluate MFCC, short time Fourier transform
(STFT), and discrete wavelet transform (DWT) to modulate
environmental sound signals in 2D representation spaces. ResNet-
18 not only outperforms other dense deep learning classifiers (i.e.,
GoogLeNet and AlexNet) in terms of recognition accuracy, but
also it considerably transfers adversarial examples to other victim
classifiers. On the balance of average budgets allocated by adver-
saries and the cost of the attack, we notice an inverse relationship
between high recognition accuracy and model robustness against
six strong adversarial attacks. We investigated this relationship to
the three 2D representation domains, which are commonly used
to represent audio signals, on three benchmarking environmental
sound datasets. The experimental results have shown that while
the ResNet-18 classifier trained on DWT spectrograms achieves
the highest recognition accuracy, attacking this model is relatively
more costly for the adversary compared to the MFCC and STFT
representations.
Index Terms—Spectrogram, discrete wavelet transform, short
time Fourier transform, Mel-frequency cepstral coefficient, en-
vironmental sound classification, adversarial attack, deep neural
network, ResNet.
I. INTRODUCTION
DEVELOPING reliable sound recognition algorithms hasalways been a significant challenge for the signal pro-
cessing community motivated by real-life applications such as
music annotation [1], emotion recognition for medical pur-
poses [2], and environmental event analysis [3]. For analyzing
surrounding scene either for surveillance [4] or multimedia
sensor networks [5], there is a constant need for understanding
environmental events. Raised by these concerns, several unsu-
pervised [6] and supervised [7] algorithms have been devised
for the classification of environmental sounds.
With the proliferation of deep learning (DL) algorithms
during the last decade for image-related tasks, large volume of
publications on 2D audio representations have been released.
The DL architectures which have been primarily developed for
computer vision applications have been well adapted for sound
recognition tasks with recognition accuracy competitive to
human understanding. However, such algorithms require large
amounts of training data. While comprehensive audio datasets
are usually not available, many data augmentation approaches
have been introduced so that to allow an appropriate training
of DL models and improve their performance on sound-related
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tasks. Dynamic range compression, time stretching, pitch-
shifting, and background noise are among those to name a
few [7]. These approaches apply directly to audio waveforms
affecting low-level sampled datapoints of the audio signal
which may not necessarily improve performance of the front-
end classification models [8]. In response to this concern,
high-level data augmentation approaches have been developed,
which are particularly useful for 2D audio representations
[9], [10]. Experimental results on a variety of environmental
sound datasets attest considerable positive impact of high-
level data augmentation on overall performance of DL clas-
sifiers (e.g., AlexNet [11], GoogLeNet [12], etc.) [8]. While
recognition performances of these models are competitive with
the human level of understanding, a recent study has demon-
strated the vulnerability of these convolutional neural networks
(ConvNets) trained on 2D representations of audio signals
against adversarial attacks [13]. Their experiments have been
primarily conducted on the combination of discrete wavelet
transform (DWT), short-time Fourier transform (STFT), and
cross recurrence plot (CRP) spectrograms. Moreover, they
have shown that crafted adversarial examples are transferable
not only between two dense ConvNets, but also to support
vector machines (SVM). This poses a potential harm for sound
recognition systems, especially when the highest recognition
accuracy has been reported on 2D representations of audio
signals [14]. Developing reliable environmental sound classi-
fiers obliges to study adversarial attacks in greater details and
measure their impacts on different sound representations.
Toward proposing robust classifiers, there have been some
debates and case studies on the link between intrusion of
adversarial examples and loss functions for some victim clas-
sifiers [15]. It has been shown that the integration of more
convex loss functions in the victim model (or in the surrogate
counterpart) might increase the chance of crafting stronger
adversarial examples [15]. It might also depend on some other
key factors such as the properties of the classifier, input sample
distribution, adversarial setups, etc. In order to study other
potential links between robustness and input representation,
we evaluate the robustness and the transferability of some
state-of-the-art ConvNets against adversarial attacks trained
on different 2D sound representations. Our primary front-end
ConvNet is ResNet-18 architecture because of its superior
recognition performance compared to other ConvNet architec-
tures. We discuss the ResNet-18 architecture in Section IV-B
and briefly report our findings on other dense architectures
such as GoogLeNet and AlexNet in Section V.
Our main contribution in this paper is demonstrating the
lower vulnerability of residual networks trained on DWT
spectrograms compared to STFT and MFCC representations
on the balance of the average budget (number of iterations
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or callbacks). Furthermore, we show that there is a covariant
relationship between high recognition accuracy and fooling
rate of these victim ConvNets, averaged over allocated budgets
for searching optimal perturbations. This paper is organized
as follows. In Section II, we briefly review some strong
adversarial attacks for 2D audio representations. Explanations
on different 2D audio representations that have been used in
the experiments are summarized in Section III. Experimental
results as well as associated discussions are presented in
Section IV. The conclusions and perspectives of future work
are presented in the last section.
II. ADVERSARIAL ATTACKS
An adversarial attack can be formulated as an optimization
problem toward achieving a very small perturbation parameter
δ as stated in Eq. 1 [16].
min
δ
f∗(x+ δ) 6= f(x) (1)
where x and f∗ denote a legitimate random sample and the
post-activation function of the victim classifier, respectively.
The optimal value for δ should be as small as possible so as to
not being perceivable by the human visual system. Although
perceiving the applied perturbation on 2D audio representa-
tions such as spectrograms is very difficult. To satisfy such a
constraint, many attack algorithms have been introduced both
in white and black-box scenarios. In this paper, we briefly go
over six strong targeted and non-targeted adversarial attacks,
which are well adapted to sound recognition models trained
on 2D audio representations. We use the average fooling rate
of these attacks which is a standard metric for assessing the
robustness of victim ConvNets trained on different 2D audio
representations.
A. Limited-Memory Broyden-Fletcher-Goldfarb-Shanno (L-
BFGS)
Szegedy et al. [16] discuss that the viability of fooling deep
neural networks with fake examples is due to their extremely
low probability because such examples are rarely seen in a
given dataset. This could be understood as the pitfall of deep
networks in low generalizability to unseen but very similar
samples. However, they propose an optimization algorithm to
mislead finely trained DL models, based on Eq. 2:
min
x′
c ‖‖2 + Jw(x′, l′) (2)
where c is a positive scaling factor achievable by the line
search strategy, x′ denotes the associated crafted adversarial
example, l′ refers to its target label, and Jw denotes the
loss function for updating weights (w). There is a variety of
choices for this function such as cross-entropy loss or any
other surrogate function. The solution of this optimization
problem is quite costly and it has been proposed to use the L-
BFGS optimizer, subject to 0 ≤ x′ ≤ M where M refers
to the maximum possible intensity in a spectrogram. This
attack is the baseline for the adversarial algorithms that are
subsequently presented.
B. Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM)
Goodfellow et al. [17] explain the existence of adversarial
examples of linear nature of deep neural networks even
those with super-dense hidden layers. Toward this claim, they
proposed a fast optimization algorithm based on Eq. 3:
x′ ← x+  · sign(∇xJ(x, l)) (3)
where  is a small constant for controlling the applied per-
turbation to the legitimate sample x. Different choices of
`p norms can be integrated into the FGSM attack, and the
adversary should make a trade-off between high similarities
and a large enough perturbation to be able to fool a model.
The formulation of Eq. 3 for `2 norm is shown in Eq. 4.
x′ ← x+  ∇xJ(x, l)‖∇xJ(x, l)‖ (4)
where for satisfying the constraint x′ ∈ [0,M ], the resulting
adversarial spectrogram should be clipped or truncated. This
white-box adversarial attack is targeted toward a pre-defined
wrong label by the adversary in a one-shot scenario.
C. Basic Iterative Method (BIM)
This non-targeted adversarial attack [18] is in fact the
iterative version of the FGSM optimization algorithm, which
crafts and positions potential adversarial examples ideally
outside of legitimate subspaces via optimizing Eq. 5 for :
x′n+1 ← clipx,
{
x′n +  · sign(∇xJ(xn, l))
}
(5)
where clip is a function for keeping generated examples within
the range [x− ,x+ ] as defined in Eq. 6.
min
{
M,x+ ,max{0,x− ,x′}} (6)
where M=255 for 8-bit RGB visualization of spectrograms.
There are two implementations for this optimization al-
gorithm either by keeping optimizing up to reach the first
adversarial example (BIM-a) or continue optimizing to a
predefined number of iterations (BIM-b). The latter usually
generates stronger adversarial examples, though it is more
costly since it usually requires more callbacks. Both BIM
attacks are iterative and white-box algorithms minimizing
Eq. 5 for optimal perturbation  measured by `∞ norm.
D. Jacobian-based Saliency Map Attack (JSMA)
Similar to the FGSM attack, this algorithm also uses gra-
dient information for perturbing the input taking advantage of
a greedy approach [19]. This attack is targeted toward a pre-
defined wrong label (l′). In fact, it optimizes for argminx ‖x‖
subject to f∗(x + x) = l′ (optimizing with `0). There are
three steps in developing JSMA adversarial examples. First,
computing the derivative of the victim model as Eq. 7.
∇f(x) = ∂fj(x)
∂xi
(7)
where xi denotes pixels intensities. Second, a saliency map
should be computed to detect the least effective pixel val-
ues for perturbation according to the desired outputs of the
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model. Specifically, the saliency map for pixels in cases where
∂fl(x)/∂xi < 0 or
∑
j 6=l ∂fj(x)/∂xi > 0 should be set to
zero since there are detectable variations, otherwise:
Smap(x, l
′)[i] =
∂fl(x)
∂xi
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
j 6=l′
∂fj(x)
∂xi
∣∣∣∣∣∣ (8)
where Smap denotes the saliency map for every given spec-
trogram x and target label l′. The last step of the JSMA is
applying the perturbation on the original input according to
the achieved map.
E. Carlini and Wagner Attack (CWA)
This is an iterative and white-box adversarial algorithm [15],
which can use three types of distance metrics: `0, `∞, and `2
norms. In this paper, we focus on the latter distance measure,
which makes the algorithm very strong even against distillation
network. The optimization problem in this attack is given by
Eq. 9.
min

‖x′ − x‖22 + cf(x′) (9)
where c is a constant value as explained in Eq. 2. Assuming
the target class is l′ and G(x′)i denotes the logits of the trained
model f before softmax activation corresponding to the i-th
class, then:
f(x′) = max
{
max
i 6=l′
{G(x′)i} −G(x′)l′ ,−κ
}
(10)
where κ is a tunable confidence parameter for increasing mis-
classification confidence toward label l′. The actual adversarial
example is given by Eq. 11.
x′ =
1
2
[tanh(arctanh(x) + ) + 1] (11)
where the tanh activation function is used in replacement of
box-constraint optimization. For non-targeted attacks, Eq. 10
should be updated as:
f(x′) = max
{
G(x′)l −max
i6=l
{G(x′)i} ,−κ
}
(12)
F. DeepFool Adversarial Attack
Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [20] proposed a white-box algo-
rithm for finding the most optimal perturbation for redirecting
the position of a legitimate sample toward a pre-defined target
label using linear approximation. The optimization problem
for achieving optimal  is given by Eq. 13.
argmin ‖‖2 s.t. sign(f(x′)) 6= sign(f(x)) (13)
where  = −f(x)w/‖w‖22. DeepFool can also be modified
to a non-targeted attack optimizing for hyperplanes of the
victim model. In this paper, we implement targeted DeepFool
attack and averaged over available labels measuring over `2
and `∞. In practice, this scenario is not only faster but also
more destructive than BIMs.
In the next section we provide a brief overview of common
2D representations of audio signals using time-frequency
transformations. Finally, we carry out our adversarial experi-
ments on the transformed audio signals (spectrograms).
III. 2D AUDIO REPRESENTATIONS
Representing audio signals using time-frequency plots is
a standard operation in audio and speech processing, which
aims representing such signals into a compact and informative
way. Fourier and wavelet transforms are the most commonly
used approaches for mapping an audio signal into frequency-
magnitude representations. In this section we briefly review
some of the most common approaches.
A. Short-Time Fourier Transform (STFT)
For a given continuous signal a(t) which is distributed over
time, its STFT using a Hann window function w(τ) can be
computed using Eq. 14.
STFT
{
a(t)
}
(τ, ω) =
∫ ∞
−∞
a(t)w(t− τ)e−jωtdt (14)
where τ and ω are time and frequency axes, respectively. This
transform is quite generalizable to discrete time domain for a
discrete signal a[n] as:
STFT
{
a[n]
}
(m,ω) =
∞∑
n=−∞
a[n]w[n−m]e−jωn (15)
where m n and ω is a continuous frequency coefficient. In
other words, for generating the STFT of a discrete signal, we
need to divide it into overlapping shorter length sub-signals
and compute Fourier transform on it, which results in an
array of complex coefficients. Computing the square of the
magnitude of this array yields to a spectrogram representation
as shown in Eq. 16.
(16)SpSTFT
{
a[n]
}
(m,ω) =
∣∣∣∣∣
∞∑
n=−∞
a[n]w[n−m]e−jωn
∣∣∣∣∣
2
This 2D representation shows frequency distribution over
discrete time and compared to the original signal a[n], it has
a lower dimensionality, although it is a lossy operation.
B. Mel-Frequency Cepstral Coefficients (MFCC)
This transform is a variation of the STFT with some ad-
ditional postprocessing operations including non-linear trans-
formation. For every column of the achieved spectrogram, we
compute its dot product with a number of Mel filter bank
(power estimates of amplitudes distributed over frequency).
For increasing the resolution of the resulting vector, logarith-
mic filtering should be applied and finally, it will be mapped
to another 1D representation using discrete cosine transform.
This representation has been widely used for sound en-
hancement and classification. Furthermore, it has been well
studied as a standard approach for conventional generative
models incorporating Markov chain and Gaussian mixture
modes [21], [22].
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C. Discrete Wavelet Transform (DWT)
Wavelet transform maps the continuous signal a(t) into
time and scale (frequency) coefficients similar to STFT using
Eq. 17.
DWT
{
a(t)
}
=
1√|s|
∫ ∞
−∞
a(t)ψ
(
t−τ
s
)
dt (17)
where s and τ denote discrete scale and time variations,
respectively, and ψ is the core transformation function which
is also known as mother function (see Eq. 18). There are a
variety of mother functions for different applications such as
the complex Morlet which is given by Eq. 18:
ψ(t) =
1√
2pi
e−jωte−t
2/2 (18)
Discrete time formulation for this transform is shown in
Eq. 19.
DWT
{
a[k, n]
}
=
∫ ∞
−∞
a(t)h
(
nakT − t) (19)
where n and k are integer values for the continuous mother
function of h. Spectral representation for this transformed
signal is a 2D array which is computed by Eq. 20:
SpDWT
{
a(t)
}
=
∣∣DWT{a[k, n]}∣∣ (20)
In the next section, we explain our experiments on three
benchmarking sound datasets. We firstly generate separate
spectrogram sets with the three aforementioned representation
using different configurations. Second, we train a ResNet on
these datasets and run adversarial attack algorithms against
them. Finally, we measure both the fooling rate and the cost
of attacks. We demonstrate that for different spectrogram
configurations these metrics are meaningfully different.
IV. EXPERIMENTS
We use three environmental sound datasets in all our
experiments: UrbanSound8k [23], ESC-50 [24], and ESC-
10 [24]. The first dataset includes 8732 four-second length
audio samples distributed in 10 classes: engine idling, car
horn, children playing, drilling, air conditioner, jackhammer,
dog bark, siren, gun shot, and street music. ESC-50 is a
comprehensive dataset with 50 different classes and overall
2000 five-second length audio recordings of natural acoustic
sounds. A subset of this dataset is ESC-10 which has been
released with 10 classes and 400 recordings.
For increasing both the quality and the quantity of sam-
ples of these datasets we apply pitch shifting augmentation
approach with scales 0.75, 0.9, 1.15, and 1.5 as proposed in
[8], which positively affect classification accuracy. This data
augmentation operation generates four extra audio samples
for every original audio sample and eventually it increases
the size of the original dataset by the factor of four. We
discuss the usefulness of this 1D data augmentation approach
in Section V.
In the following subsection, we explain the details of
generating 2D representations for audio signals. To this aim we
use the open-source Librosa signal processing python library
[25] and our upgraded version of the wavelet toolbox [26].
A. Generating Spectrograms
For every dataset including augmented signals we sepa-
rately generate independent sets of 2D representations, namely
MFCC, STFT, and DWT. Our aim is to investigate which audio
representation yields a better trade-off between recognition
accuracy and robustness for a victim model against a variety
of strong adversarial attacks.
1) MFCC Production Settings: There are four major set-
tings in generating MFCC spectrogram using Librosa. The
default value for sampling rate is 22050 Hz. Since there is
no optimal approach for determining the best sampling rate
so that generate the most informative spectrogram, we run
extensive experiments using sampling rates from 8 to 24 kHz.
The second tunable hyperparameter is the number of MFCCs
(NMFCC) which we examine different values for it: 13, 20,
and 40 per frame with hop length of 1024. Normalization of
discrete cosine transform (type 2 or 3) using orthonormal DCT
basis for MFCC production is the third setting. By default,
this hyperparameter is set to true in almost all the libraries
including Librosa, although we measure performance of the
front-end classifier trained to MFCC spectrograms without
normalization. The last argument is about the number of
cepstral filtering (CF ) [27] to be applied on MFCC features.
The sinusoidal CF reduces involvement of higher order coeffi-
cients and improve recognition performance [28] (see Eq. 21).
M←M
[
1 + sin
(
pi(n+ 1)
CF
)]
CF
2
(21)
where M stands for MFCC array with size [n, :]. We in-
vestigate the effect of CF on the overall performance of
classification models.
2) STFT Production Settings: For producing STFT repre-
sentations, we use default configurations for general hyperpa-
rameters as outlined in the Librosa manual. For assigning the
length of the windowed signal, we use 2048, 1024, and 512
with associated sampling rates. We also use variable window
size: 2048 (default value), 1024, and 512 (very small win-
dow) associated with default hop size of 512. We investigate
potential effects of these configurations for the resiliency of
the victim models against adversarial attacks.
3) DWT Production Settings: For generating DWT repre-
sentations, we modified the sound explorer software [26] to
support Haar and Mexican Hat wavelet mother functions in
addition to complex Morlet. Sampling frequency for DWT
spectrograms has been set up to 8 kHz and 16 kHz with
constant frame length of 50 ms. Moreover, by convention, the
overlapping threshold is set to 50%. In our experiments we
measure the impacts of these DWT configurations visualized
in logarithmic scale (for higher resolution) on both recognition
accuracy and robustness against adversarial attacks.
In the next subsection, we discuss possible choices for the
classification models to be separately trained on the aforemen-
tioned spectrogram representations and setups. We select our
final front-end classifier from a diverse domain of traditional
handcrafted-based feature learning algorithms to state-of-the-
art DL architectures.
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B. Classification Model
For the choice of classification algorithms, we initially
included both conventional classifiers such as linear and Gaus-
sian SVM [13], random forest [8], and some deep leaning
architectures. Specifically, we selected pre-trained GoogLeNet,
AlexNet, and ResNet [29] models tuned for our three bench-
marking datasets. We preserved the architectures of these Con-
vNets except for the first layer and the last layer for mapping
logits into class labels (softmax layer). The dimension of
spectrograms at the input layer has been also kept as defined
in the standard implementations of these networks. Since
spectrograms may have different dimensions according to their
length and transformation schemes, we bilinearly interpolate
them to fit 128×128 for all the ConvNets.
Performance comparison of the aforementioned SVMs,
GoogLeNet and AlexNet against a few adversarial attacks have
already been studied mainly for DWT representations of envi-
ronmental sound datasets in [13]. Their experiments have been
conducted on standard spectrograms without validating poten-
tial impacts of different settings in the process of producing
different representations. In this paper, we carry out extensive
experiments using: (i) three common 2D representations for
audio signals, namely MFCC, STFT, and DWT; (ii) more and
stronger targeted and non-targeted algorithms for adversarial
attacks; (iii) fair comparison on fooling rates of victim models
taking their cost of attacks averaged over the allocated budgets
into account.
We primarily select a ConvNet as our front-end classifier for
the sake of simplicity and interpretability of results. We present
concise results for other classification models in Section V.
For such an aim, we selected ResNet architectures because
such ConvNet is currently the best-performing classifiers for
several tasks [30]. Our implementations corroborate that, on
average, these ConvNet architectures outperform all the above-
mentioned algorithms (both SVMs and other DL approaches)
trained on spectrograms. Among the possible architectures for
ResNet (ResNet-18, ResNet-34, and ResNet-56), we selected
ResNet-18 according to its highest recognition performance
and relatively low number of parameters compared to others.
Recalling that, we investigate potential effects of spectrogram
configurations on the classifier which not only has a very
competitive recognition accuracy compared to others, but also
requires less number of training parameters. Thus herein,
we specifically focus on the ResNet-18 network and all our
investigations will consider this victim architecture.
For every configuration to produce the 2D representations,
we generate an individual set of spectrograms and train an
independent ResNet-18 classifier on each set. We use a 5-
fold cross validation setup on 70% of the overall dataset
volume (training plus development). For avoiding overtraining,
we implemented early stopping technique in training and
finally report mean recognition accuracy on the test sets (30%
remaining).
C. Adversarial Attacks
In this section, we provide details for attacking the mod-
els trained on 2D audio representations. We examine their
robustness against six strong adversarial attacks by reporting
obtained average fooling rates using the area under the ROC
curve (AUC) as a performance metric.
1) Settings for Attack Algorithms: In FGSM and BIMs
attacks, possible ranges for  have been defined from 0.001
to any possible supremum under different confidence intervals
(≥ 65%). For the implementation of the DeepFool attack, we
use the open-source Foolbox package [31] with iterations from
100 to 1000 (10 different scales with a step of 100). In the
implementation of the JSMA attack, the number of iterations
has been set to (miγ)/ni where mi and ni denote the total
number of pixels and scaling factor within [0, 200] (with
displacement a of 40), respectively. Also γ is the maximum
allowed distortion (ideally < 1.5/255) within the maximum
number of iterations. Budget allocated to CWA is within
{1, 3, 7, 9} for search steps in c within {25, 100, 1k, 2k, 5k}
iterations in each search step using early stopping. For targeted
attacks (i.e., FGSM, JSMA, and CWA) we randomly select
targeted wrong labels for running adversarial optimization
algorithms.
We executed these attack algorithms on two NVIDIA GTX-
1080-Ti with 4× 11 GB of memory except for the DeepFool
attack, which was executed on 64-bit Intel Core-i7-7700 (3.6
GHz) CPU with 64 GB memory. For attacks on the smallest
dataset (ESC-10), we used batches of 200 samples. For larger
datasets (ESC-50 and UrbanSound8k), we used 25 batches of
100 samples.
2) Adversarial Attacks for MFCC Representations: We
firstly investigate the potential effect of different sampling
rates in MFCC production on the performance of the trained
models. To this end, sampling rates have been selected from
fairly low (8 kHz) to moderately high (24 kHz) ranges includ-
ing the default frequency value (22.05 kHz) defined in Librosa.
Therefore, we trained four ResNet-18 models per dataset
associated with four sampling rates. The results summarized in
Table I show that the recognition performance of the classifiers
is, to some extent, dependent on the sampling rates. For ESC-
10 and UrbanSound8k datasets, the sampling rate of 8 kHz
improves recognition accuracy while 16 kHz works better for
ESC-50. These results imply that a low sampling rate filters
out high frequency components and negatively affects learning
of discriminative features from the spectrograms.
We attack these models using the aforementioned six ad-
versarial algorithms and measure their fooling rates aver-
aged over different budgets as explained in Section IV-C.
From the results shown in Table I, we notice an inverse
relationship between recognition accuracy and robustness of
these models, on average. For instance, ResNet-18 trained on
MFCC spectrograms of the ESC-10 dataset sampled at 8 kHz
reaches the highest recognition accuracy, but this model is
less robust against five out of six adversarial attacks, averaged
over the allocated budgets. We present two hypotheses on this
issue. Firstly, adversarial attacks are essentially optimization-
based problems and their final results are dependent on
the hyperparameters defined by the adversary. Confidence
intervals, number of callbacks to the original spectrogram,
number of iterations in optimization formulation, line search
for the optimal coefficient are among those to name a few.
SUBMITTED TO IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION FORENSICS AND SECURITY, VOL. X, NO. X, JULY 2020 6
TABLE I: Performance comparison of models trained on MFCC representations with different sampling rates averaged over
experiments and budgets. Relatively better performances are in bold face.
Dataset Sampling Recognition AUC Score, Number of Gradients for Adversarial AttacksRate (kHz) Accuracy (%) FGSM DeepFool BIM-a BIM-b JSMA CWA
ESC-10
8 73.23 0.9822, 1 0.9473, 074 0.9710, 065 0.9801, 110 0.9308, 096 0.9912, 1346
16 72.15 0.9456, 1 0.9607, 046 0.9334, 059 0.9375, 197 0.9144, 151 0.9616, 1435
22.05 72.06 0.9467, 1 0.9518, 129 0.9309, 088 0.9379, 186 0.9145, 213 0.9405, 1471
24 70.13 0.9471, 1 0.9341, 078 0.9298, 115 0.9327, 171 0.9233, 091 0.9302, 1149
ESC-50
8 69.89 0.9517, 1 0.9023, 061 0.9612, 084 0.9703, 193 0.9288, 118 0.9598, 2418
16 70.21 0.9849, 1 0.9912, 248 0.9871, 209 0.9903, 160 0.9508, 251 0.9672, 2639
22.05 69.97 0.9534, 1 0.9386, 331 0.9430, 423 0.9581, 288 0.9233, 219 0.9434, 2318
24 67.25 0.9433, 1 0.9214, 208 0.9307, 159 0.9415, 216 0.9187, 417 0.9652, 2744
UrbanSound8k
8 71.25 0.9905, 1 0.9895, 326 0.9411, 317 0.9950, 223 0.9623, 398 0.9708, 2791
16 70.81 0.9508, 1 0.9215, 631 0.9346, 519 0.9389, 817 0.9447, 442 0.9449, 3805
22.05 69.57 0.9457, 1 0.9151, 269 0.9449, 184 0.9256, 513 0.9370, 416 0.9456, 3015
24 69.33 0.9440, 1 0.9221, 318 0.9236, 299 0.9120, 862 0.9242, 343 0.9371, 2816
Fooling rate of a victim model is dependent on tuning these
hyperparameters. Our second hypothesis is on the statistical
perspective of training a neural network. A model with higher
recognition accuracy has probably learned a better decision
boundary via maximizing the intra-class similarity and inter-
class dissimilarity. Attacking this model, provides a wider
search area for the adversary to find pinholes of the model,
especially when the decision boundaries among classes lie
in the vicinity of each other. Table I also compares average
number of gradient for batch execution required by every
attack algorithm. Regarding statistics of this table, CWA is
the costliest adversarial attacks for spectrograms with different
sampling rates.
The default value for the number of MFCCs (NMFCC) is 20
as defined in Librosa. However, we encompass values from
a minimum number of 13 to a maximum of 40 in gener-
ating MFCC spectrograms; although increasing NMFCC>20
introduces redundancy in frequency coefficient representation.
Our experimental results corroborate the negative effect of
a low NMFCC in the performance of the classifiers. More
specifically, recognition performance of the trained models
on spectrograms with NMFCC = 13 is 14% less than models
trained on spectrograms with NMFCC≥20, on average. Our
experimental results on attacking victim models trained on
spectrograms with low NMFCC unveils their extreme vulnera-
bilities. However, in terms of cost of the attack, these models
need fewer callbacks for gradient computations for yielding
AUC>90% (see Fig. 1). This could be due to the nature of
adversarial attacks as optimization formulations regardless of
the performance of the victim models.
Using orthonormal discrete cosine transform basis function
is a standard approach in crafting MFCC spectrograms. In our
experiments we produced two separate subsets of spectrograms
with and without normalization to measure its potential effect
on both the recognition accuracy and the fooling rate (see
Fig. 2). Disabling this normalization scheme causes a drop in
the recognition accuracy and in the cost of the attack of the
models to 7% and 8.5%, respectively on average.
For the choice of the cepstral filtering, we covered values in
the range
[
0, (d×NMFCC)
]
where maximum d is 2.5 with hop
size of 0.5 in the production of spectrograms. Values above the
supremum of this interval generate higher-order coefficients in
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Fig. 1: Effect of NMFCC on the recognition accuracy and
on the average cost of the attack (number of batch gradient
computation) over six adversarial algorithms for ResNet-18
models.
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Fig. 2: Normalization effect on the recognition accuracy and
on the average cost for reaching AUC>0.9 over six adversarial
algorithms for ResNet-18 models.
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linear-like weighting distributions which considerably reduce
recognition accuracy on average to about 48%. Optimal values
for d are 0, 0.5, and 0.3 for ESC-10, ESC-50, and Urban-
Sound8k, respectively (see Fig. 3).
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Fig. 3: Cepstral filtering effect on the recognition accuracy and
on the average cost for reaching AUC>0.9 of attack over six
adversarial algorithms for ResNet-18 models.
3) Adversarial Attacks for STFT Representations: There
is a significant similarity in producing MFCC and STFT
spectrograms mainly in terms of transformation and frequency
modulation. Therefore, we omit experimental results relevant
to measuring impacts of sampling rates on the robustness of
victim classifiers. Fooling rates of ResNet-18 models on STFT
representations are similar to MFCC representations and such
rates support the aforementioned inverse relationship between
recognition accuracy and robustness against attacks.
Table II summarizes adversarial experiments conducted on
STFT representations with the same aforementioned setup
described in Section IV-C. This table illustrates the impact of
the number of FFTs (NFFT) both on the recognition accuracy
and on the robustness of victim models against adversarial
attacks averaged over all the different adversarial setups. For
ESC-10 and ESC-50 datasets, NFFT=1024 results in learning
better decision boundaries for the classifiers, although it in-
creases fooling rates of the victim models. In production of
STFT spectrograms, each frame of a given audio signal is
spanned by a window which covers the frame. The maximum
length of this window can be equivalent to the number of
NFFT. Since small window lengths improve the temporal
resolution of the final STFT representation, we evaluate the
performance of the models on small window lengths in the
range
[(
0.25×NFFT
)
, NFFT
]
with hop size of NFFT/4. As
shown in Fig. 4, the evaluation on ESC-50 and UrbanSound8k
datasets uncovers that models trained on STFT representations
with window length of 0.5×NFFT outperform others. On the
ESC-10 dataset, window length of NFFT resulted in better
performance in terms of recognition accuracy.
Comparing the recognition accuracy of Tables I and II
shows that STFT provides better discriminative features for the
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Fig. 4: Effect of scales for NFFT on the recognition accuracy
and on the average cost of the attack for reaching AUC>0.9
over six adversarial algorithms for ResNet-18 models.
ResNet-18 classifier since such a model achieved lower recog-
nition accuracy on MFCC representations. Additionally, while
the AUC scores across the six attacks are not so different,
ranging from 0.93 to 0.99, the number of gradient required for
models trained on STFT spectrograms are considerably higher
than MFCC spectrograms. In summary, STFT spectrograms
provide a better accuracy and a little hard to attack, even if
they can be fooled with high success by all six adversarial
attacks.
4) Adversarial Attacks for DWT representations: There is
no algorithmic approach for obtaining the optimal mother
function to generate DWT spectrograms. Therefore, we have
employed several functions, from simple Haar to complex
Morlet to investigate the potential impacts on the recognition
accuracy and on the adversarial robustness of the victim
models. We exploited an analytical approach recasting mul-
tiple experiments. Table IV shows that although complex
Morlet mother function outperforms other mother functions
in terms of recognition accuracy. However, it shows more
vulnerability against adversarial examples, averaged over six
attack algorithms with different budgets.
Table III compares the recognition accuracy of models
trained on DWT representations with complex Morlet mother
function. We have evaluated these models on DWT spectro-
grams with sampling rates of 8 kHz and 16 kHz. Whereas for
ESC-50, sampling rate of 8 kHz shows better performance
for the classifiers comparing their recognition accuracies.
There are three findings in these tables. Firstly, averaged over
all the allocated budgets for the attacks, models trained on
DWT representations demonstrate a slightly higher robustness
against adversarial attacks compared to MFCC and STFT
spectrograms. Secondly, the highest recognition accuracy has
been achieved for classifiers trained on DWT representations.
Thirdly, the trade-off between recognition accuracy and ad-
versarial robustness of the victim models are noticeable for
different sampling rates. Moreover, the cost of the attack
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TABLE II: Performance comparison of models trained on STFT representations with different NFFT averaged over experiments
and budgets. Relatively better performances are in bold face.
Dataset Number Recognition AUC Score, Number of Gradients for Adversarial Attacksof FFTs Accuracy (%) FGSM DeepFool BIM-a BIM-b JSMA CWA
ESC-10
512 82.41 0.9768, 1 0.9430, 089 0.9576, 109 0.9717, 134 0.9662, 141 0.9846, 1415
1 024 85.17 0.9823, 1 0.9701, 129 0.9715, 091 0.9792, 183 0.9531, 209 0.9905, 2008
2 048 80.56 0.9651, 1 0.9544, 092 0.9407, 163 0.9529, 279 0.9588, 341 0.8731, 1730
ESC-50
512 82.44 0.9786, 1 0.9542, 082 0.9583, 109 0.9665, 244 0.9614, 128 0.9618, 1995
1 024 84.49 0.9881, 1 0.9512, 331 0.9871, 267 0.9798, 179 0.9702, 361 0.9896, 2353
2 048 83.12 0.9567, 1 0.9631, 145 0.9765, 211 0.9606, 567 0.9738, 399 0.9729, 2412
UrbanSound8k
512 90.58 0.9761, 1 0.9414, 583 0.9513, 442 0.9682, 421 0.9402, 345 0.9539, 2569
1 024 91.74 0.9827, 1 0.9752, 322 0.9340, 471 0.9687, 719 0.9515, 502 0.9654, 3271
2 048 92.23 0.9895, 1 0.9764, 643 0.9407, 602 0.9630, 408 0.9623, 655 0.9673, 3342
TABLE III: Performance comparison of models trained on DWT representations with different sampling rates averaged over
different budgets. Relatively better performances are shown in bold face.
Dataset SamplingRate (kHz)
Recognition
Accuracy (%)
AUC Score, Number of Gradients for Adversarial Attacks
FGSM DeepFool BIM-a BIM-b JSMA CWA
ESC-10 8 85.67 0.9456, 1 0.9310, 429 0.9307, 612 0.9411, 744 0.9324, 781 0.9483, 420516 82.04 0.9068, 1 0.9192, 672 0.9437, 490 0.9347, 513 0.9018, 801 0.9216, 4439
ESC-50 8 80.34 0.9462, 1 0.9335, 367 0.9161, 452 0.9314, 809 0.9168, 298 0.9233, 398116 85.97 0.9376, 1 0.9256, 409 0.9314, 628 0.9419, 701 0.9173, 561 0.9236, 4575
UrbanSound8k 8 94.70 0.9401, 1 0.9279, 761 0.9315, 841 0.9511, 738 0.9207, 691 0.9320, 468416 91.83 0.9321, 1 0.9274, 533 0.9125, 719 0.9408, 941 0.9139, 774 0.9430, 4879
TABLE IV: Comparison of mother functions on the perfor-
mance of the models. Outperforming values are shown in bold
face.
Dataset MotherFunction
Average Recognition
Accuracy (%)
Average
AUC Score
ESC-10
Haar 82.14 95.14
Mexican Hat 84.51 94.19
Complex Morlet 85.67 95.61
ESC-50
Haar 83.08 92.16
Mexican Hat 84.33 93.40
Complex Morlet 85.97 95.38
UrbanSound8k
Haar 91.22 96.16
Mexican Hat 93.48 95.63
Complex Morlet 95.17 96.09
(number of gradient computations) for models trained on DWT
is considerably higher than other two representations.
In all these experiments, we assumed a frame length of 50
ms with 50% overlapping to convolve the input signal with
mother functions. We have also carried out experiments on
studying the potential effect of frame length in performance
of the models. They showed that short frame lengths (e.g., 30
ms) drop the recognition performance of the models for the
three benchmarking datasets. Additionally, long frames such as
50 ms introduce a high redundancy in frequency plots, which
results in dropping the recognition accuracy (see Fig. 5). Fig. 6
visually compares crafted adversarial examples for the three
representations. Although they are visually very similar to their
legitimate counterparts, they confidently drive the classifier
toward wrong predictions. This showcases the active threat
of adversarial attacks for the sound recognition models.
V. DISCUSSION
In this section we provide additional discussion regarding
our results. We briefly discuss some secondary aspects of our
experiments which could be relevant for future studies.
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Fig. 5: DWT frame length effect on the recognition accuracy
and on the average cost of the attack for yielding AUC>0.9
over six adversarial algorithms for ResNet-18 models.
A. Neural Network Architecture
For selecting the front-end classifier, we measured recog-
nition accuracy and total number of training parameters for
all candidates. We explored DL architectures without residual
blocks (AlexNet) and with inception blocks (GoogLeNet) for
the choice of victim classifiers. Our experiments unveiled
that these dense networks do not outperform ResNet-18 in
terms of recognition accuracy. Although average recognition
accuracy of ResNet-18 and GoogLeNet are competitive on
spectrograms, the latter has 1.41× more training parameters.
On average, recognition performance of AlexNet is 8% lower
than ResNet-18, even if it has 61% fewer parameters. Further-
more, recognition performance of other ResNet models such as
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Original Attacked Spectrograms
Spectrograms FGSM DeepFool BIM-a BIM-b JSMA CWA
MFCC ‖‖2 = 0.51, l′ = 2 ‖‖2 = 0.67, l′ = 3 ‖‖2 = 0.71, l′ = 4 ‖‖2 = 0.93, l′ = 5 ‖‖0 = 1.18, l′ = 6 ‖‖2 = 1.47, l′ = 7
STFT ‖‖2 = 0.82, l′ = 2 ‖‖2 = 1.39, l′ = 3 ‖‖2 = 0.64, l′ = 4 ‖‖2 = 1.24, l′ = 5 ‖‖0 = 1.31, l′ = 6 ‖‖2 = 1.73, l′ = 7
DWT ‖‖2 = 1.13, l′ = 2 ‖‖2 = 1.36, l′ = 3 ‖‖2 = 1.96, l′ = 4 ‖‖2 = 1.49, l′ = 5 ‖‖0 = 2.03, l′ = 6 ‖‖2 = 2.38, l′ = 7
Fig. 6: Crafted adversarial spectrograms for the three audio representations. The original audio sample has been randomly
selected from the class of dog bark (l = 1). Examples shown in columns two to seven are associated with the six adversarial
attacks for the original input sample. Required perturbation () and the target labels (l′) are shown under each spectrogram.
ResNet-34 and ResNet-56 are very competitive to ResNet-18,
but the latter requires 50% fewer parameters. In comparing the
robustness of these models against adversarial attacks, they all
can reach fooling rates higher than 95%. Taking the allocated
budgets into account, the ResNet-18 is the costliest network
in terms of the number of required gradient computations for
the adversary, followed by GoogLeNet and AlexNet.
B. Data Augmentation
For improving the performance of the classifiers, we aug-
mented the original datasets only at waveform level (1D) using
time-stretching filter except for DWT representations which
we additionally scaled the spectrograms by a logarithmic
function. Removing 1D data augmentation negatively affects
recognition accuracy of the models with drop ratios of about
0.056%, 0.036%, and 0.029% for MFCC, STFT, and DWT
spectrograms, respectively. For measuring the robustness of
these models against adversarial examples, we run attack
algorithms on random batches of size 100 among the entire
datasets. The experimental results have shown that for reaching
the fooling rates as close as the values reported in Tables I to
III, less gradient computation is required mainly for JSMA
and CWA attacks.
C. Adversarial on Raw Audio
All adversarial attack algorithms discussed in this paper
were developed for any 2D representation, from natural images
to spectrograms. Unfortunately, these adversarial attacks do
not fit end-to-end classifiers trained on audio waveforms [32],
[33]. Optimizing Eq. 1 even for a very short audio signal
sampled at a low rate is very costly and they are not transfer-
able while being played over the air [34]. Toward addressing
this interesting open problem, we trained several end-to-end
ConvNets on randomly selected batches of environmental
sound datasets. Upon running both targeted and non-targeted
attacks against ConvNets we could reduce performance of
victim classifiers by 30% in average. Interestingly, multiplying
the adversarial examples by a random small scalar restore
correct label of the audio waveforms. In other words, whereas
adversarial spectrograms, 1D adversarial audio waveforms are
not resilient against any additional perturbation. This probably
goes back to the nature of audio signals regardless of the
number of channels they may contain.
D. Adversarial Transferability
Adversarial examples are transferable from each victim
model to another [35]. To address this question we explored
this potential property on deep neural networks trained on
different spectrograms. Table V reports the transferability
ratios averaged over budgets with batch sizes of 100. Crafted
adversarial examples for victim models are less transferable in
MFCC representations while DWT spectrograms have higher
transferring rates on average. Examples generated in STFT
domain are more transferable compared to MFCC, this may be
due to the higher order of information in STFT spectrograms.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we demonstrated the covariant relationship
between recognition accuracy and robustness of ResNet-18
trained on 2D representations of environmental audio signals
averaged over allocated budgets by the adversary. This rela-
tionship is generalizable to other DL architectures and this
is a common behavior for models trained on spectrograms.
Additionally, we showed that our front-end classifier can reach
the highest recognition accuracy when it is trained on DWT
representation. Furthermore, attacking this model is on average
more costly for the adversary compared to models trained on
MFCC and STFT representations. This proves the superiority
of DWT representation for environmental sound recognition.
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TABLE V: Average transferability ratio of adversarial examples among ConvNets. Higher ratios are shown in boldface.
MFCC STFT DWTDataset Models ResNet-18 GoogLeNet AlexNet ResNet-18 GoogLeNet AlexNet ResNet-18 GoogLeNet AlexNet
ResNet-18 1 0.672 0.568 1 0.713 0.641 1 0.761 0.774
GoogLeNet 0.693 1 0.480 0.637 1 0.519 0.646 1 0.684ESC-10
AlexNet 0.491 0.521 1 0.540 0.562 1 0.633 0.701 1
ResNet-18 1 0.644 0.519 1 0.661 0.609 1 0.755 0.732
GoogLeNet 0.630 1 0.531 0.578 1 0.569 0.507 1 0.676ESC-50
AlexNet 0.523 0.536 1 0.551 0.601 1 0.614 0.699 1
ResNet-18 1 0.627 0.677 1 0.611 0.710 1 0.714 0.713
GoogLeNet 0.634 1 0.503 0.563 1 0.699 0.723 1 0.707Urban8k
AlexNet 0.577 0.583 1 0.703 0.735 1 0.705 0.678 1
Moreover, we examined the transferability of crafted adver-
sarial examples among AlexNet, GoogLeNet, and ResNet-18
for the three spectrogram representations. According to our
results, the lowest transferability ratio was achieved for MFCC
spectrograms averaged over six different adversarial attacks.
In our future studies, we are determined to investigate this
property for networks trained on speech datasets.
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